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Introduction 
 
At the time when a number of agreements and treaties aiming at strengthening financial and 
economic cooperation between BRICS countries are being concluded, it is evident that the 
ultimate aim of the BRICS grouping is to further its financial and economic integration with the 
possibility of scrapping any barrier to capital movement such as the component countries’ 
respective exchange control regulations. Nonetheless, such a decision for capital market 
liberalisation among BRICS member countries should be informed by economic factors rather 
than simply by political stance if capital market liberalisation is deemed to be mutually beneficial 
among all the member countries.  
It is unfortunate that the approach to financial integration or capital market liberalisation has 
often been driven as much by philosophy and political circumstances as by economic factors 
(Kose, et al., 2009). The benefit of capital market liberalisation may be unequally shared when 
such a decision is taken without consideration of economic and financial dynamics.  
Risk sharing in the context of cross transmission of volatility has been evoked as the most 
important prerequisite for beneficial financial integration or capital market liberalisation. (Kose et 
al., 2009)). Moreover, Bekaert et al. (2005) show that the positive link between capital market 
liberalisation and economic growth is made possible through the lower cost of capital that is 
derived through risk sharing. Risk sharing between countries encourages cross holding of foreign 
assets, which insures domestic residents against country-specific shocks to their income. Risk 
sharing logically allows for greater diversification of income risk, which, in turn, spurs economic 
growth through greater specialisation (Kose et al., 2011; Kalemli-Ozcan, 2003). This reality 
suggests that the increased probability of cross transmission of shocks between country 
members of a specific grouping not only indicates the increased degree of financial integration 
but also shows the possibility of a beneficial cooperation. Thus, successful and beneficial capital 
market liberalization between BRICS countries should be conditioned upon the existence of risk 
sharing or cross transmission of their market volatility or risk.   
Against this background, this paper endeavours to assess the extent and magnitude of cross 
transmission of equity-market volatility shocks among the BRICS to infer the economic benefit 
that could result from possible capital market liberalization. The results of this paper should 
inform policy makers of BRICS member countries whether it would be beneficial at this juncture 
of time to further liberalise their capital market by scrapping the existing exchange control 
regulation for a free flow of capital within the grouping.   
Given that exchange control regulation is applied in order to insulate countries against massive 
capital outflow and possible currency crisis, especially during major global and internal financial 
crisis, it is important to ascertain that any reversal of the regulation – albeit only among BRICS 
partners – will not affect small countries such as South Africa.  The premise of this paper is that 
BRICS countries, especially small countries within BRICS such as South Africa, need to ascertain 
that the precondition for risk sharing or cross transmission of volatility shocks is fulfilled before 
attempting to further liberalise their capital markets.  
It is well documented that in the context of globalization, big economies are the beneficiaries 
of capital flow, to the detriment of small economies, especially during periods of financial crises. 
For example, Mendoza et al. (2009) show that the United States (US) has increased its net 
holding of risky assets, characterized by equity portfolio and FDI, since the inception of 
globalization in the 1980s. This situation arises mainly because investors perceive the US as a 
safe haven for their assets and that there is massive capital flow from risky economies to safer 
economies such as the US during major financial crises. Moreover, Stiglitz (2002), referring to 
the darker side of globalization, indicates that much of the instability that occurred in East Asia 
in the mid-1990s was because the affected countries yielded to the pressure for capital market 
liberalization without properly shielding their economies. The author supports safeguard 
measures such as exchange control regulation to manage the risk of capital market liberalization 
characterised by massive capital flow from less-developed economies to industrial economies.  
It is intuitive that the US will attract capital flow from less developed countries, especially during 
the crisis periods, simply because there is no reciprocity or cross transmission of risks or 
volatilities between the US and less developed economies. Crisis in the US can contaminate less-
developed economies and the contrary is probably not evident. In the absence of risk sharing or 
cross transmission of shocks among countries, the benefits of financial liberalisation are 
unequally shared among nations.  Countries that are able to transmit risks to others without 
being themselves exposed by risks from those countries are set to become the main beneficiary 
and recipients of portfolio and direct investment inflow at the cost of countries that are fragile 
and susceptible to contaminations from external risks.  
The difference in the size of BRICS economies may raise a concern on their mutual influence in 
terms of cross transmission of volatility shocks. China is the biggest economy of the BRICS 
countries. China’s GDP in 2011 was by far the largest among the BRICS economies (World 
Bank, 2012). South Africa is the smallest economy in the BRICS grouping with a population of 
50 million, close to 27 times less than in China. The 2011 GPD of South Africa was close to 18 
times less than that of China, 6 times less than Brazil and 4 times less than Russia and India 
(World Bank, 2012). Moreover, the market capitalisation of the biggest mainland China’s stock 
exchange, Shanghai Stock Exchange, is 5 times the market capitalisation of the South African’s 
stock exchange, the Johannesburg stock exchange in 2011 (IMF, 2012). This notable difference 
in the size of the two economies may indicate the possibility of an unequal benefit that may arise 
from further financial liberalisation in the absence of risk sharing. 
In order to assess the extent and magnitude of risk sharing or cross transmission of volatility 
shocks between BRICS countries, this paper makes use of the spillover measure based on 
forecast error variance decompositions from vector autoregressions (VARs) as proposed by 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012). The paper extends this methodology by modelling ex ante 
volatility spillover of the BRICS countries, whereby volatility series of BRICS countries are 
computed on the basis of a fractionally integrated general autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedastic (FIGARCH) model to account for long memory in their respective equity 
markets. 
 The empirical results of the cross transmission of volatility shocks show that risks are shared 
asymmetrically between BRICS countries and that South Africa, a smaller BRICS country, is 
more of a receiver than a transmitter of volatility shocks in the grouping.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, the methodological approach is discussed with a 
particular focus on the FIGARCH model, as well as on volatility spillover approach used in the 
paper. Section 3 presents the results of the paper and the conclusion of the paper is provided in 
Section 4.  
Methodology  
In order to assess the cross transmission of volatility shocks between BRICS economies, this 
paper employs the spillover index framework suggested by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012) and 
extends the framework to the case of ex ante volatility spillover with volatility series obtained 
from FIGARCH model.  
Diebold and Yilmaz’s spillover index is based on the vector autoregressive model (VAR) model 
specified as: 
ttt YY   1       (1) 
Where tY  is the vector of equity return volatilities of BRICS countries as in this paper. Applying 
Wold decomposition in Equation 1, the following moving average of the VAR is obtained as: 
tt LY )(       (2) 
where 
1)1()(  LL  . The structural form of Equation 2 can be represented as tt LAY )(   
where 1)()(  tQLLA  and ttt Q   . tQ  can be identified by using the lower-triangular 
Choleski decomposition or any other identification scheme, depending on a chosen goal.  
With a 1-step-ahead forecasting given by  
tt YY 1       (3) 
and the error vector of the n variables in the vector tY  represented by 
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and its covariance can be expressed as 
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With this notation, the variance of the one-step error in forecasting tY1 is expressed as: 
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Diebold and Yilmaz made a difference between ‘own variance shares’ and ‘cross variance shares’ 
where the former refers to the fraction of the one-step-ahead error variances in forecasting iy
due to shocks to iy and the latter, also known as ‘spillover’, refers to the fractions of the 1-step-
ahead error variances in forecasting iy  
due to shocks to jy  with ji  . Total spillover can be 
obtained by summing up all the cross variance shares.  Therefore, the spillover index is obtained 
by the ratio of the total spillover and the total forecast error variation, also known as
)( 00AAtrace . This spillover index is obtained by assuming orthogonalisation based on Cholesky 
decomposition or factorisation, which is order dependent in a VAR framework. To obtain a 
spillover index that is independent of the results of ordering, Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) show 
that the generalised VAR framework of Pesaran and Shin (1998) can be applied. Thus the 
volatility spillover index can be obtained as  
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Where )(
~
H
g
ij
  is the normalised H-step-ahead generalised forecast error variance 
decomposition, which is independent of the order of variables in the VAR system (see Koop, et. 
al.,, 1996; Pesaran and Shin, 1998). )(HS
g
is the spillover index. 
Contrary to the study by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012) that made use of the realised volatility 
to obtain the time series of market volatility, this paper constructs  the elements of vector tY , the 
volatility series, with the aid of the FIGARCH model to account for a long memory of equity 
market volatility and the persistence of its shocks. It is important to note that in the tradition of 
volatility modelling, the IGARCH model has been often used to account for long memory of 
volatility series and the persistence of its shocks (Lamoureux and Lastrapes, 1990). Nonetheless, 
Baillie et al. (1996) contend that the IGARCH model is too restrictive, as it implies an infinite 
persistence of volatility shocks. The authors introduce the FIGARCH model, which accounts for 
the presence of long memory. However, the model allows a slow hyperbolic rate of decay of 
volatility shocks.  
It can be proven that the IGARCH model is a particular case of the FIGARCH model. Given 
for example an IGARCH (p,q) expressed as  
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Equation 6 can be written as  
ttt hLLh )()(
2
0        (8) 
Where L is the lag operator and LLLL q  ...)( 21 . th is the conditional variance. 
The IGARCH model can be expressed as an ARMA process in 2t  as follows: 
tt LLLL  )](1[0)1)](()(1[
2    (9) 
Where ttt h
2  and it is interpreted as the shock to conditional variance.  
Baillie et al. (1996) show that the FIGARCH model is obtained by replacing the first difference 
operator )1( L in the above equation by dL)1(   with 10  d . Thus, the ARMA 
representation of the FIGARCH model is written as  
tt
d LLLL  )](1[)1)](()(1[ 0
2    (10) 
The alternative representation of Equation 9 is obtained as  
    20 )1)(()(1)(1 tdt LLLhL      (11) 
It is clear from this representation that if d is close to unity, the FIGARCH model becomes 
closer to an IGARCH model, indicating long persistence of volatility shocks. 
Data, Empirical analysis and Discussion of Results 
The ex ante volatility series used to estimate the volatility spillover index between BRICS 
countries are modelled with the use of the FIGARCH model. The volatility series is obtained in 
two steps. First, BRICS equity market returns are computed as the first difference of the natural 
logarithm of equity market indices. Data are weekly local-currency equity market indices made of  
MICEX index (Russia), Johannesburg All Share Index (South Africa), S&P CNX Nifty index 
(India), BOVESPA index (Brazil) and the Shanghai stock exchange index, A share and B share 
(China).  The sample period spans from January 1998 to December 2011.  The FIGARCH 
(1,d,1) model is used to estimate the conditional volatility series for each of the countries that are 
used to compute spillover index. The order of the model is determined according to the Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC). 
Figure A1, in the appendix, displays the autocorrelation function of the absolute returns of each 
country. It is clear from the figure that there is hyperbolic decay of the autocorrelation function 
for most absolute return series. This occurrence indicates the possibility of modelling volatility 
with a long memory model, such as the FIGARCH model. 
The following FIGARCH (1,d,1) model is fitted by the quasi maximum likelihood estimator 
(QMLE) for all the countries: 
tt cy  ,        (12)  
2/1
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Where c is a constant mean. 
The results of the estimation of Equations 12 and 13 are reported in Table 1.  
Table 1 Estimated FIGARCH (1,d,1) model 
 Russia South Africa India Brazil China 
Coefficients      
c  0.579* 0.351** 0.492* 0.391* 0.089 
0  3.655 2.425*** 2.467** 9.212** 1.007 
1  -0.961* 0.018 -0.436* -0.758* 0.309 
1  -0.950* -0.176 -0.578* -0.743* 0.132 
d  0.255* 0.289* 0.350* 0.22* 0.355** 
)50(Q  8.25(0.89) 60.90(0.13) 63.73(0.091) 52.27(0.385) 78.28(0.006) 
)50(2Q  59.28(0.124) 49.45(0.413) 44.45(0.619) 27.47(0.992) 41.82(0.722) 
oodLoglikelih  -2172.37 -1898.438 -1881.65 -2091.941 -1767 
*, ** and *** denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. Expression in bracket indicates probability for the 
rejection of the null hypothesis.  
The results reported in Table 1 show that the coefficients of the FIGARCH (1,1) are statistically 
significant and the positivity constraint for the model is observed, especially for Russia, India and 
Brazil. Moreover the misspecification tests, in particular the Ljung-Box portmanteau test of up to 
50 lags (Q50) for no serial correlation in the standardised and the squared standardised residuals, 
show that the null hypotheses of no serial correlation are not rejected at the 5% level – at least 
for all countries except China. Moreover, a number of coefficients of the FIGARCH model for 
South Africa are statistically not significant. It is clear from the estimation that the conditional 
volatility of equity markets for South Africa and China could not be fitted with a FIGARCH 
model. Thus, based on the likelihood statistics, the conditional volatility of China’s equity market 
was fit with a the Exponential GARCH (EGARCH (1,1)) model. The loglikelihood for this 
model is estimated at -1766.30 compared with  -1767.813 for the FIGARCH (1,1) model of the 
same country. The figures confirm the best fit of EGARCH model China.   Nonetheless, the 
conditional volatility of the South African equity market formed a better fit with a GARCH (1,1) 
model, improving the loglikelihood to -1897.61, compared to -1898.438 for the case of the 
FIGARCH(1,1) model. 
Figure 1 displays the ex ante or conditional volatility series of the BRICS countries obtained from 
the different GARCH models, as discussed above. These volatility series are used to compute the 
spillover index between BRICS countries as per the objective of this paper. Nonetheless, it is 
worth noting from Figure 1 that conditional volatility in BRICS countries reacts in tandem 
mostly to global volatility shocks, such as the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. Moreover, Figure 
1 shows that there is some evidence of the reaction of the BRICS’ equity market conditional 
volatilities to regional shocks, such as the Russian currency crisis in 1998 and the South 
American economic crisis of 2002. 
 
Figure 1 Volatility series of BRICS countries 
 
 
In the next step, the computed BRICS’ equity market conditional volatilities are used to estimate 
the volatility spillover index and its dynamics by making use of the forecast error variance 
decomposition in the context of the generalised VAR framework. The volatility spillover, as well 
as the spillover index, is computed by making use of a 10-week forecast horizon in obtaining the 
forecast error variance. Nonetheless, to control for the influence of the global financial shocks 
on BRICS countries, the estimated VAR model includes the US conditional volatility as an 
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exogenous variable. It is important to note that conditional volatility of the US equity market is 
modelled with the use of the EGARCH (1,1), which provides the highest loglikelihood value. 
The paper provides the full sample analysis of volatility spillover, as well as the rolling-sample 
analysis, to account for the possible changes that occur in the transmission of volatility shocks 
between BRICS countries during the periods covered by the paper. With regard to the full 
sample analysis, the ij th cell in Table 2 presents the computed volatility spillover values, which 
represent the estimated contribution to the forecast error variance of country i  coming from 
shocks to country j . For example, one can read from Table 2 that shocks to Russia’s volatility 
are responsible for 20% of the error variance in forecasting the 10-week-ahead South African 
volatility but only 0.3% of the error variance in forecasting Chinese volatility. The amounts 
indicate that volatility spillovers from Russia to South Africa are larger than from Russia to 
China. Moreover, the results reported in Table 2 show that volatility spillovers from South Africa 
to other BRICS countries are much lower (14%) than total volatility spillovers from other BRICS 
countries to South Africa (31%). This result shows that South Africa is more of a receiver of 
volatiltiy spillovers from other BRICS countries than a transmitter of volatility to other BRICS 
economies. This asymmetric transmission of volatility spillover between BRICS countries does 
not augur well for the principle of risk sharing, which is an important condition for beneficial 
financial integration in the face of full capital market liberalisation. 
 
Table 2. Volatility spillovers between BRICS countries 
 Russia SA India Brazil China From 
Others 
Russia 88.8 8.3 0.3 1.9 0.7 11 
South Africa 20 68.7 5.8 4.5 1 31 
India 1.1 1.9 93.7 0.6 2.7 6 
Brazil 16.6 4 1.3 77.5 0.6 22 
China 0.3 0.1 1.1 0.4 98.1 2 
Contribution to others 38 14 8 7 5 73 
Contribution including own 127 83 102 85 103 14.60% 
 
Another important result that emerges from Table 2 is that the spillover index, which is the 
summary of all the cross-country spillover, is 14.60%. This estimation of the spillover index 
suggests that a great deal of volatility within BRICS countries (85.40%) is due to shocks from 
other sources than BRICS cross-country spillover.  This reality is confirmed in Figure 3, which 
depicts the cyclical movement in volatility spillover between BRICS countries. Figure 3 is 
obtained by estimating the model using 120-week rolling samples of spillover indices. The 
cyclical spillover plot in Figure 2 shows that periods of high volatility spillover between BRICS 
countries corresponds to global financial and economic events such as: 
- The Brazilian currency crisis in 1999, which further spread to other Latin American 
coutries as well as most emerging markets; 
- The burst of dot-com bubble or information technology bubble with NASDAQ 
composite index losing more than 10% from its peak and emerging equity market being  
considerably affected by the collapse of the NASDAQ; 
- The Latin American crisis of 2001 and 2002 – mostly triggered by currency crisis in 
Argentina and Brazil; 
-  The US terrorist attack of September 2001, which was another important event that 
affected global financial markets;  
- The strong signal by the US Federal Reserve Bank to hike in the Fed Funds rates in May 
2006, which triggered massive capital flows from emerging markets; and 
- The subprime mortgage crisis, which triggered a global financial crisis.  
 
Figure 2 cyclical movements in the spillover of BRICS 
 
The rolling sample spillover index plot reveals clearly how emerging markets in general and 
BRICS countries in particular are more affected by global events than by local and regional 
events. This reality suggests that not only there is asymmetric transmission of shocks between 
BRICS countries but these countries are not insulated from global financial events that can affect 
their capital movements. Asymmetric transmission of volatility shock indicates that any initiative 
for full capital market liberalisation will create losers and winners within the BRICS countries. 
China, the less affected by volatility shocks of other BRICS countries, may become the safe 
haven drawing capital from other BRICS countries. 
In order to test the robustness of our results, we estimated this time the volatility spillover and 
the spillover index by making use of the forecast error variance obtained from a 2-week-ahead 
forecast horizon. The results reported in Table 3 show that the pattern of cross volatility 
spillover did not change. The results show that South Africa is still highly influenced by other 
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BRICS countries, with 38% of its equity volatility emanating from other BRICS countries and 
propagating a total of 16% of volatility shocks to other BRICS countries.  
Table 3. Volatility spillovers between BRICS countries from a 2-week-ahead forecast horizon 
 Russia SA India Brazil China From 
Others 
Russia 86.2 10.1 1.1 1.9 0.8 14 
South Africa 23.1 62 4.1 8.7 2.2 38 
India 2 1.4 92.7 1.4 2.6 7 
Brazil 13.6 4.8 1.3 77.4 2.9 23 
China 1.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 98.2 2 
Contribution to others 40 16 7 12 8 84 
Contribution including own 127 78 99 90 107 14.60% 
 
The spillover index remains low at 16.70%, indicating the vulnerability of the BRICS countries to 
volatility shocks emanating outside of the grouping. These findings confirm the asymmetric 
propagation of shocks in the BRICS grouping with South Africa being a receiver rather than 
propagators of volatility shocks within the BRICS grouping. The vulnerability of South Africa to 
shocks from other BRICS countries indicates that caution must be exercised before South Africa 
approves any legislation that supports full capital market liberalisation, albeit between BRICS 
countries. Being the least influenced by volatility shocks from other BRICS countries, China may 
become the safe haven of the BRICS grouping benefiting from full capital market liberalisation 
by attracting portfolio investment, especially during periods of financial crisis. Just as Mendoza et 
al. (2009) indicate that the US benefited from globalisation by attracting risky asset mainly from 
small and vulnerable economies, China may become the net beneficiary of risky assets from 
other BRICS countries in case BRICS grouping opts from full capital market liberalisation.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper endeavoured to assess the extent of the cross transmission of volatility shocks or risk 
sharing between BRICS countries in order to be able to infer their readiness for full capital 
market liberalisation. Making use of the spillover index obtained from the forecast error variance, 
the paper finds that the cross transmission of volatility spillover is asymmetrically distributed 
between BRICS countries. The smaller countries in the grouping, such as South Africa, are more 
receivers than transmitters of volatility shocks within the grouping. Such an asymmetric 
transmission of shocks denotes the risk of massive capital outflow from small BRICS countries 
to more influential countries such as China, which seems insulated from volatility shocks from 
other BRICS countries. The paper suggests that it is too soon for BRICS countries to think 
about full capital market liberalisation at this time because of this asymmetric risk sharing. For 
future research, we suggest that other measures of risk sharing be used to assess the extent of the 
transmission of risks between BRICS countries. 
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Appendix 
Figure A1 Autocorrelation function of absolute returns of BRICS equity markets  returns             
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